A week ago we published a story about new amplification attacks using memcached protocol on UDP port 11211. A few things happened since then: Github announced it was a target of 1.3Tbps memcached attack. OVH and Arbor reported similar large attacks with the peak reported at 1.7Tbps.
Over last couple of days we've seen a big increase in an obscure amplification attack vector - using the memcached protocol, coming from UDP port 11211. In the past, we have talked a lot about amplification attacks happening on the internet.
Processor problems have been in the news lately, due to the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities. But generally, engineers writing software assume that computer hardware operates in a reliable, well-understood fashion, and that any problems lie on the software side of the software-hardware divide.
This is a guest post by Elie Bursztein who writes about security and anti-abuse research. It was first published on his blog and has been lightly edited. This post provides a retrospective analysis of Mirai — the infamous Internet-of-Things botnet that took down major websites via massive distributed denial-of-service using hundreds
When building a DDoS mitigation service it’s incredibly tempting to think that the solution is scrubbing centers or scrubbing servers. I, too, thought that was a good idea in the beginning, but experience has shown that there are serious pitfalls to this approach. A scrubbing server is a dedicated