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Cloudflare helps verify the security of end-to-end encrypted messages by auditing key transparency for WhatsApp

2024-09-24

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Chances are good that today you’ve sent a message through an end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging app such as WhatsApp, Signal, or iMessage. While we often take the privacy of these conversations for granted, they in fact rely on decades of research, testing, and standardization efforts, the foundation of which is a public-private key exchange. There is, however, an oft-overlooked implicit trust inherent in this model: that the messaging app infrastructure is distributing the public keys of all of its users correctly.

Here’s an example: if Joe and Alice are messaging each other on WhatsApp, Joe uses Alice’s phone number to retrieve Alice’s public key from the WhatsApp database, and Alice receives Joe’s public key. Their messages are then encrypted using this key exchange, so that no one — even WhatsApp — can see the contents of their messages besides Alice and Joe themselves. However, in the unlikely situation where an attacker, Bob, manages to register a different public key in WhatsApp’s database, Joe would try to message Alice but unknowingly be messaging Bob instead. And while this threat is most salient for journalists, activists, and those most vulnerable to cyber attacks, we believe that protecting the privacy and integrity of end-to-end encrypted conversations is for everyone.

There are several methods that end-to-end encrypted messaging apps have deployed thus far to protect the integrity of public key distribution, the most common of which is to do an in-person verification of the QR code fingerprint of your public key (WhatsApp and Signal both have a version of this). As you can imagine, this experience is inconvenient and unwieldy, especially as your number of contacts and group chats increase.

Over the past few years, there have been significant developments in this area of cryptography, and WhatsApp has paved the way with their Key Transparency announcement. But as an independent third party, Cloudflare can provide stronger reassurance: that’s why we’re excited to announce that we’re now verifying WhatsApp’s Key Transparency audit proofs. 

Auditing: the next frontier of encryption 

We didn’t build this in a vacuum: similar to how the web and messaging apps became encrypted over time, we see auditing public key infrastructure as the next logical step in securing Internet infrastructure. This solution builds upon learnings from Certificate Transparency and Binary Transparency, which share some of the underlying data structure and cryptographic techniques, and we’re excited about the formation of a working group at the IETF to make multi-party operation of Key Transparency-like systems tractable for a broader set of use cases. 

We see our role here as a pioneer of a real world deployment of this auditing infrastructure, working through and sharing the operational challenges of operating a system that is critical for a messaging app used by billions of people around the world.   

We’ve also done this before — in 2022, Cloudflare announced Code Verify, a partnership in which we verify that the code delivered in the browser for WhatsApp Web has not been tampered with. When users run WhatsApp in their browser, the WhatsApp Code Verify extension compares a hash of the code that is executing in the browser with the hash that Cloudflare has of the codebase, enabling WhatsApp web users to easily see whether the code that is executing is the code that was publicly committed to. 

In Code Verify, Cloudflare builds a non-mutable chain associating the WhatsApp version with the hash of its code.

Cloudflare’s role in Key Transparency is similar in that we are checking that a tree-based directory of public keys (more on this later) has been constructed correctly, and has been done so consistently over time.

How Key Transparency works

The architectural foundation of Key Transparency is the Auditable Key Directory (AKD): a tree-shaped data structure, constructed and maintained by WhatsApp, in which the nodes contain hashed contact details of each user. We’ll explain the basics here but if you’re interested in learning more, check out the SEEMless and Parakeet papers.

The AKD tree is constructed by building a binary tree, each parent node of which is a hash of each of its left and right child nodes:

Each child node on the tree contains contact and public key details for a user (shown here for illustrative purposes). In reality, Cloudflare only sees a hash of each node rather than Alice and Bob’s contact info in plaintext.

An epoch describes a specific version of the tree at a given moment in time, identified by its root node. Using a structure similar to Code Verify, the WhatsApp Log stores each root node hash as part of an append-only time structure of updates.

What kind of changes are valid to be included in a given epoch? When a new person, Brian, joins WhatsApp, WhatsApp inserts a new “B” node in the AKD tree, and a new epoch. If Alice loses her phone and rotates her key, her “version” is updated to v1 in the next update.  

How we built the Auditor on Cloudflare Workers 

The role of the Auditor is to provide two main guarantees: that epochs are globally unique, and that they are valid. They are, however, quite different: global uniqueness requires consistency on whether an epoch and its associated root hash has been seen, while validity is a matter of computation — is the transition from the previous epoch to the current one a correct tree transformation?

Timestamping service

Timestamping service architecture (Cloudflare Workers in Rust, using a Durable Object for storage)

At regular intervals, the WhatsApp Log puts all new updates into the tree, and cuts a new epoch in the format “{counter}/{previous}/{current}”. The counter is a number, whereby “previous” is a hexadecimal encoded hash of the previous tree root, and “current” is a hexadecimal encoded hash for the new tree root. As a shorthand, epochs can be referred to by their counter only.

Here’s an example:

1001/d0bbf29c48716f26a951ae2a244eb1d070ee38865c29c8ad8174e8904e3cdc1a/e1006114485e8f0bbe2464e0ebac77af37bce76851745592e8dd5991ff2cd411

Once an epoch is constructed, the WhatsApp Log sends it to the Auditor for cross-signing, to ensure it has only been seen once. The Auditor adds a timestamp as to when this new epoch has been seen. Cloudflare’s Auditor uses a Durable Object for every epoch to create their timestamp. This guarantees the global uniqueness of an epoch, and the possibility of replay in the event the WhatsApp Log experiences an outage or is distributed across multiple locations. WhatsApp’s Log is expected to produce new epochs at regular intervals, given this constrains the propagation of public key updates seen by their users. Therefore, Cloudflare Auditor does not have to keep the durable object state forever. Once replay and consistency have been accounted for, this state is cleared. This is done after a month, thanks to durable object alarms.

Additional checks are performed by the service, such as checking that the epochs are consecutive, or that their digest is unique. This enforces a chain of epochs and their associated digests, provided by the WhatsApp Log and signed by the Auditor, providing a consistent view for all to see.

We decided to write this service in Rust because Workers rely on cloudflare/workers-rs bindings, and the auditable key directory library is also in Rust (facebook/akd).

Tree validation service

With the timestamping service above, WhatsApp users (as well as their Log) have assurance that epochs are transparent. WhatsApp’s directory can be audited at any point in time, and if it were to be tampered with by WhatsApp or an intermediary, the WhatsApp Log can be held accountable for it.

Epochs and their digests are only representations of their underlying key directory. To fully audit the directory, the transition from the previous digest to a current digest has to be validated. To perform validation, we need to run the epoch validation method. Specifically, we want to run verify_consecutive_append_only on every epoch constructed by the Log. The size of an epoch varies with the number of updates it contains, and therefore the number of associated nodes in the tree to construct as well. While Workers are able to run such validation for a small number of updates, this is a compute-intensive task. Therefore, still leveraging the same Rust codebase, the Auditor leverages a container that only performs the tree construction and validation. The Auditor retrieves the updates for a given epoch, copies them into its own R2 bucket, and delegates the validation to a container running on Cloudflare. Once validated, the epoch is marked as verified.

Architecture for Cloudflare’s Plexi Auditor. The proof verification and signatures stored do not contain personally identifiable information such as your phone number, public key, or other metadata tied to your WhatsApp account.

This decouples global uniqueness requirements and epoch validation, which happens at two distinct times. It allows the validation to take more time, and not be latency sensitive.

How can I verify Cloudflare has signed an epoch?

Anyone can perform audit proof verification — the proofs are publicly available — but Cloudflare will be doing so automatically and publicly to make the results accessible to all. Verify that Cloudflare’s signature matches WhatsApp’s by visiting our Key Transparency website, or via our command line tool.

To use our command line tool, you’ll need to download the plexi client. It helps construct data structures which are used for signatures, and requires you to have git and cargo installed.

cargo install plexi

With the client installed, let’s now check the audit proofs for WhatsApp namespace: whatsapp.key-transparency.v1. Plexi Auditor is represented by one public key, which can verify and vouch for multiple Logs with their own dedicated “namespace.” To validate an epoch, such as epoch 458298 (the epoch at which the log decided to start sharing data), you can run the following command:

plexi audit --remote-url 'https://akd-auditor.cloudflare.com' --namespace 'whatsapp.key-transparency.v1' --long
Namespace
  Name              	: whatsapp.key-transparency.v1
  Ciphersuite       	: ed25519(protobuf)

Signature (2024-09-23T16:53:45Z)
  Epoch height      	: 489193
  Epoch digest      	: cbe5097ae832a3ae51ad866104ffd4aa1f7479e873fd18df9cb96a02fc91ebfe
  Signature         	: fe94973e19da826487b637c019d3ce52f0c08093ada00b4fe6563e2f8117b4345121342bc33aae249be47979dfe704478e2c18aed86e674df9f934b718949c08
  Signature verification: success
  Proof verification	: success

Interested in having Cloudflare audit your public key infrastructure?

At the end of the day, security threats shouldn’t become usability problems — everyday messaging app users shouldn’t have to worry about whether the public keys of the people they’re talking to have been compromised. In the same way that certificate transparency is now built into the issuance and use of digital certificates to encrypt web traffic, we think that public key transparency and auditing should be built into end-to-end encrypted systems by default, so that users never have to do manual QR code verification again.

We built our auditing service to be general purpose, reliable, and fast, and WhatsApp’s Key Transparency is just the first of several use cases it will be used for – Cloudflare is interested in helping audit the delivery of code binaries and integrity of all types of end-to-end encrypted infrastructure. If your company or organization is interested in working with us, you can reach out to us here.

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Thibault Meunier|@thibmeu
Mari Galicer|@mmvri
Cloudflare|@cloudflare

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