How does a Magecart-style attack work?
Magecart-style attacks are of particular concern to online retailers with users entering credit card details on the checkout page. Forms for online banking are also high-value targets along with login pages and anywhere else where you enter personal details online.
Attackers have a number of routes through which they can compromise a popular library and get their malicious code running on an unknowing vendor’s website, which include:
- Compromising third-party providers
- Compromising the website itself
- Exploiting vulnerabilities
Frequently, the third-party providers themselves get compromised and attackers gain the ability to modify code that’s being distributed to a number of websites; this was the case with the Ibenta breach that compromised Ticketmaster. Alternatively, if attackers gain admin access to the site itself, they can modify one of the scripts being used and insert their malicious code — which happened in 2018 to British Airways. Libraries that have reached their end of life and are no longer maintained by their creators are vulnerable to zero-day exploits. Automated attacks have been seen compromising thousands of checkout pages in one go by taking advantage of this.
What can be done about it?
Application security providers and security teams are able to provide several defense mechanisms for site owners that include:
Content Security Policies: Page Shield uses a content security policy (CSP) deployed with a report-only directive to collect information from the browser about the scripts running on an application. That allows us to provide basic visibility to application owners about the files that are running on their site.
Static Analysis: Downloading the script and performing automated analysis on the content using machine learning techniques or databases of handwritten signatures can identify malicious scripts that would otherwise go undetected.
Threat Feeds: Databases of malicious hostnames or URLs are effective at capturing malware we already know about and complement detection capabilities that are targeted at novel attacks.
Subresource Integrity Checks: Application owners can include a cryptographic hash of the files they are loading in the ‘integrity’ attribute of any script or link. This is effective at protecting against unexpected changes at the source by malicious third parties.
External Connection Checks: Extracting a list of external connections being made by each script and comparing these against blocklists and allowlists can help spot malicious exfiltration attempts to attacker-controlled domains.
Page Shield currently leverages CSP reports, threat-intelligence feeds, and ML-based static analysis in order to detect malicious scripts. We think static analysis has an important role to play in the detection of client-side threats with the ability to detect attacks that are unlikely to be found with the other mechanisms.
Some ways we’re doing static analysis
Our static analysis system covers two scenarios:
- The code is readable, and its functionality has not been obscured
- The functionality of the code has been obscured (with or without malicious intent)
This gives four categories of script to analyze:
- Benign scripts
- Malicious scripts
- Obfuscated or minified benign scripts
- Obfuscated malicious scripts
We’ve developed separate models for the two scenarios mentioned above. The first is targeted at detecting ‘clean’ scripts, where the code has not been obscured. The second looks at obfuscated scripts and differentiates between malicious and benign content.
The detection of ‘clean’ malicious scripts relies on an analysis of the script’s data flow properties which are derived from a representation of the script called an abstract syntax tree. Consider the following very simple example script:
This script has an associated abstract syntax tree (AST), a graph-based representation of the structure of the program, and a key tool in static analysis of malware. The below diagram shows a sample of the AST from the above code snippet.
Page Shield uses a script’s AST to detect whether a significant change has occurred in the structure of the program (triggering a change alert), and also to derive the script’s corresponding data flow graph, which tracks the flow of data between variable assignments and function calls. The figure below shows the raw data flow graph derived from the AST for our simple example.
We have developed an ML model capable of identifying nodes on the graph that relate to PII reads or malicious data exfiltration which produces the likelihoods on the graph shown below. The nodes in blue have been classified as related to PII and those in red as being related to data exfiltration:
A script can be classified as malicious if there’s a connected path on the graph between nodes involved in the reading of PII and nodes that form part of the data exfiltration call to an attacker-controlled domain:
Models agnostic to the connection between the PII-read and exfiltration call are prone to false positives in scenarios where they are unrelated. Our data-flow based approach allows us to effectively detect attacks while eliminating false positives from disconnected logic.
Malicious actors, however, are usually trying to evade detection, and in order to avoid being spotted will often conceal their attack by encoding and transforming the content beyond recognition. Our second model handles this type of content and is able to differentiate between benign and malicious use of obfuscation.
The below example shows an attack that's been obscured via the inclusion of hex-encoded strings in a list
_0xb902 which is subsequently referenced.
The concept of ‘revealed-risk’ — how risky the revealed content is, forms the core of our approach for differentiating between obfuscated malware and legitimate uses of character encoding or minification. For example, revealing keywords like “cc_number” and “stringify” in the above example provides a strong signal that this is an attack.
However, analyzing the revealed risk only works if you can normalize the content. Frequently attackers go far beyond simple character encoding schemes to hide their malicious code. It is common to see custom-defined obfuscation functions in malicious scripts that can apply any arbitrary series of transformations to the input string. For example, consider a potential encoding function:
This transforms the string
The decoding function defined in the script would be:
Normalizing strings that have been through complex transformations requires execution of the code, and so in order to avoid a trivial bypass with an encoding scheme such as the above, our model also detects the presence of malicious, encoded strings that cannot be normalized.
With our approach of analyzing clean and obfuscated content separately, looking for connected paths on the data flow graph, revealed risk or arbitrary string transformations, we’ve been able to detect most attacks that we’ve seen to date. We’re excited to see what we find as we onboard more customers onto Page Shield and will continue to evolve our detection capabilities over time.
Sign up for Page Shield today to protect your customers’ data.